James Madison University

JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository

Center for International Stabilization and Recovery

7-20-2002

DDASaccident380
Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident, "DDASaccident380" (2002). Global CWD Repository. 580.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/580

This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.

DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/05/2006

Accident number: 380

Accident time: 12:10

Accident Date: 20/07/2002

Where it occurred: Shama Village, Wadi
Jalali ash Sharq

Country: Lebanon

Primary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Demolition accident
(survey)

Date of main report: 09/08/2002

ID original source: BOI:No007/2002

Name of source: MACC SL

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: No.4 Israel AP blast /
frag

Ground condition: grass/grazing area
rocks/stones

Date record created: 22/02/2004

Date last modified: 17/03/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 3

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: GR 36 706098 670225 Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: M/F 135 and 135A

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate medical provision (?)
inadequate training (?)
inadequate metal-detector (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
safety distances ignored (?)
metal-detector not used (?)
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mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)

Accident report
A summarised MACC BOI report was made available in 2003. It is reproduced below, edited
for anonymity. The full Board of Inquiry accident report is in Related papers, under the Other
documents tab for this record.

Introduction
1. On the 11.07.02 Level 1 Survey Team was tasked by [1st commercial demining group]
Operations Manager to conduct a survey of minefields in OES-1, in the vicinity of Shama
Village, M/F numbers 135 and 135A. The tasking information was obtained from the
previously issued MACC SL OES areas minefield spread sheets. As there were access
problems in both areas, 2 x Non-Accessible Minefield reports were filed and the information
was passed back to the Operations Manager.
2. Based on the non accessible information received from the Level 1 Survey Team, the
EOD/Survey Team Leader then decided to conduct a follow visit of the area on the 17.07.02.
During this visit both M/F’s were located with the help of a local guide and 13 x mines were
seen on or near the surface. Following the visit a “Minefield Appreciation Performa” was
completed by the Team Leader.
3. On returning from the minefield appreciation visit, a meeting was held between the Team
Leader and the Operations Manager to decide what the next course of action would be. It was
decided that the best solution would be to destroy the immediate threat posed by the located
mines and following the destruction of the mines, erect a minefield fence. The task was
categorised by [1st commercial demining group] as a “Demolition/Rapid Response Task” and
was planned to be executed on the 20.07.02. As demolitions would be conducted on the
20.07.02, the Operations Manager submitted a verbal “Demolitions Notification Request” to
the MACC SL Planning Officer on the 18.07.02.
4. At 08:00 hrs on the 20.07.02 [1st commercial demining group] EOD/Survey Team deployed
on the pre-planned “Demolition/Rapid Response Task” to M/F 135 and 135A. The
EOD/Survey Team arrived at the site at 08:40hrs, established a Command Post (CP) and
conducted a communications check with [1st commercial demining group]Operations.
Following a safety brief by the Team Leader the team deployed to the vicinity of M/F 135 in
order to destroy the previously located mines. A Firing Point (FP) was located by the Team
Leader and the Team Medic and Team Observer stayed in that location whilst the Team
Leader and the Team 2i/c moved to the M/F to destroy 10 x Israeli No.4 Anti-Personnel Mines
and 1 x 52mm Mortar Bomb.
5. At 10:40 hrs a demolition serial was conducted at M/F 135 and following a period of time to
allow the smoke to dissipate and the debris to stop falling a demolition serial check was
conducted. On the signal “all clear” the team then moved across the Wadi to the vicinity of
M/F 135A location. A new FP was located and the Team Medic and the Team Observer were
dropped off at the FP. The Team Leader and the Team 2i/c then proceeded to M/F 135A to
destroy the previously located mines.
6. At M/F 135A a total number of 6 x Israeli No4 AP Mines were prepared for destruction (4 x
mines in-situ and 2 x unfuzed mines were to be used as donor charges). The mines were
located in two separate rows with 3 x mines in one row (plus 1 x donor mine) and 1 x mine in
another row (plus 1 x donor mine). [A “schematic diagram detailing the approximate position
of the mines and the demolition explosive set up, prior to the disposal serial in M/F 135A” has
been removed because it had become corrupted in file transfer.]
7. At 11:55hrs the demolition at M/F 135A was conducted, following a short time period to
allow the smoke to dissipate and the debris to stop falling, the Team Leader and the Team
2i/c moved forward to check for complete demolition. The Team 2i/c started packing the
equipment at the Bench Mark (BM), whilst the Team Leader checked the disposal serial. He
checked the first row of mines and was satisfied that a high order had been achieved on all
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four mines. He then moved forward to check the second row when an uncontrolled detonation
occurred.

Events directly following the Accident
8. At approximately 12:10 hrs an uncontrolled detonation occurred in M/F 135A, following the
uncontrolled detonation the Team Medic moved forward from the FP carrying his trauma pack
and a metal detector. On arrival of the Team Medic at the BM, the Team 2i/c started to clear a
route into and around the casualty from the BM, (the emergency marking used was orange
spray paint).
9. When an area had been cleared around the casualty, medical assistance and stabilisation
took place by the Team Medic. The Team 2i/c then called the Team Observer and told him to
inform [1st commercial demining group] Operations and tell the Team Driver to move down
from the CP to the accident site with the spine board. The Team Observer was then
instructed to move to the main road in Shama village and wait for additional medical
assistance that had been requested.
10. Following the on-site stabilisation, the casualty was then moved to the area of M/F 135A
BM. The Team 21/c then instructed the Team Observer to move back to the accident site with
water and to help with the extraction of the casualty. Prior to him moving back to the accident
site, the Team Observer instructed a local person to wait for the additional medical assets and
when they arrive direct them to the CP. The Team Observer then proceeded to pick up some
water from the CP and move back to the accident site.
11. There was then an attempt to move the casualty up the hill, but due to the very difficult
terrain, a distance of only approximately 15 meters was achieved. The Team 2i/c then again
tasked the Team Observer to go and get some local assistance from Shama village. As Team
Observer was making his way up the hill he saw a local at the top and told him to bring some
more men to assist in the extraction.
12. After a short period of time 4 x local men arrived and the extraction of the casualty to the
CP was finally achieved. At the CP the additional [1st commercial demining group] personnel
then assisted in transferring the casualty into the ambulance. Due to the difficult track
conditions, the casualty had to be physically removed from the ambulance in order to get the
vehicle over the rough terrain. On arrival at the main road the casualty was then transferred
into the Lebanese Red Cross ambulance for the journey to Jabel Amal Hospital in Tyre.
13. At 14:00hrs the casualty arrived at Jabel Amal Hospital whereupon he was transferred to
the Emergency Department where additional trauma care was administered; an X-ray was
also performed prior to him being transferred to Hammoud Hospital Sidon by the Lebanese
Red Cross at 14:40hrs.

BOI Accident Investigation Follow Up Actions
14. At 14:30 hrs [1st commercial demining group] Operations Manager arrived at the MACC
SL to brief the MACC SL Planning and QA Officer on the accident. The MACC SL QA Officer
was informed that Operations Manager will be heading [commercial demining group’s internal
inquiry] and it was decided to move to the accident scene in order to make a full appreciation
on the situation.
15. On arrival at the accident scene the BOI was met by the Team 2i/c and a full and detailed
briefing took place, prior to the BOI moving to the CP. On arrival at the CP, it was decided by
the BOI that clearance would have to take place from the CP to the accident site, before any
detailed accident investigation could take place.
16. As [1st commercial demining group]’s MDD assets were not accredited to work in low
threat suspect areas and [1st commercial demining group] Manual assets were on their rest
day on the 21.07.02, a request was made through the MACC SL Planning Officer to utilise
[Another commercial demining group’s mine-detecting dogs] and manual assets. On approval
from the MACC SL Planning Officer the BOI left the accident scene.
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17. On the 21.07.02, 23.07.02 and 24.07.02 clearance was conducted using both [Another
commercial demining group’s mine-detecting dogs] and manual assets and [1st commercial
demining group] manual assets to both M/F 135 and M/F 135A (accident site). Numerous BOI
follow up clearance targets were identified by the BOI and all targets were achieved during
the 3 x day’s clearance activities. 1 x Israeli No.4 AP mine was also located in M/F135A on
the 21.07.02, in a previously cleared area.
18. All BOI follow up clearance targets and the BOI post accident clearance are shown
pictorially Annex A and Annex B respectively. [Not made available.]

Medical Details
19. The Team Leader suffered traumatic amputation of his left foot and blast/fragmentation
injuries to his right leg. The Team Medic administered medical treatment and stabilisation onsite to the casualty. A very difficult extraction of the casualty then took place to the site CP
whereupon the casualty was transferred to the Team ambulance for the short journey to the
main road in Shama; the casualty was then transferred to a Lebanese Red Cross ambulance
for the journey to Jabel Amal Hospital in Tyre.
20. On arrival at Jabel Amal Hospital in Tyre, the casualty was transferred to the Emergency
Department where additional trauma care was administered; an X-ray was also performed
prior to him being transferred to Hammoud Hospital Sidon by the Lebanese Red Cross.

Conclusions
21. Based on the investigation, the statements and visits to the site, the BOI concludes the
following:
•

TD OES 1 # 008 was never issued to [1st commercial demining group] for clearance
operations and therefore the EOD/Survey Team was tasked with the minimum of
information on both the minefields and booby traps in the area, a fact that [1st
commercial demining group] Operations Manager was fully aware of.

•

No details of the relevant M/F or BT records were obtained from the MACC SL prior
to the activities taking place on the 17.07.02.

•

No Booby Trap (BT) information was detailed in the Minefield Appreciation Performa
completed by the Team Leader on the 17.07.02, as the information was contained in
the Task Dossier which was located at the MACC SL.

•

There are discrepancies in what was stated and what was actually recorded and
detailed in the “Demolitions Notification Request”.

•

The MACC SL Planning Officer was left without any reservation, that the “Demolitions
Notification Request” was for a standard EOD task where UXO were being destroyed
and not for mines being destroyed in a minefield.

•

The whole task was seen by [1st commercial demining group] as a “Target
Reduction” opportunity, where 2 x mined areas could be speedily cleared without any
knowledge of or input from the MACC SL Planning Officer, this was an attempt to
conduct the task under the masquerade of a “Demolition/Rapid Response Task”.

•

[1st Commercial demining group]’s EOD/Survey Teams “Demolition/Rapid Response
Task” was conducted 3 x days after the initial appreciation visit.

•

[1st Commercial demining group] Operations Manager displayed a lack of operational
command and control of the EOD/Survey Team. There was minimal task planning
and no consultation with MACC SL Planning Officer regarding a clearance operation
in a known mined area. This was in total disregard to [commercial demining group]’s
revised “Concept of Operations” dated 18.06.02.

•

The information contained in the Weekly Summary Reports submitted by [1st
commercial demining group] to the MACC SL was inaccurate.
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•

The Team Leader contravened the Directive signed on the 21.06.02 regarding his
commitment to conduct any task in accordance with [1st commercial demining
group]in-country SOPs (IMAS accredited).

•

The on-site marking in both M/F 135 and M/F 135A conducted on the 17.07.02 was
not in accordance with [1st commercial demining group] SOPs, National TSGs or
IMAS.

•

No permanent marking stores were seen by the BOI at Shama site on the 20.07.02, it
is difficult to therefore understand how a permanent fence was going to be erected
following the demolition serial.

•

No route clearance to remove the large rocks and boulders was conducted by the
EOD/Survey Team. Should this have happened then the CASEVAC of the Team
Leader would have been much smoother.

•

No [1st commercial demining group] clearance was conducted through the low threat
suspect area (from the CP to the LAF mine signs). Nor was any clearance conducted
through the high threat suspect area (from the LAF mine sign to [1st commercial
demining group]’s BM’s).

•

No PPE was worn by any member of the EOD/Survey Team during the activities
conducted in M/F 135 and M/F 135A on the 17.07.02 and 20.07.02.

•

MD-8 detectors were deployed in a known mined area with the full knowledge of the
problems associated with ground contamination and the detector compensator.

•

Manual demining probes were used in a known mined area with the full knowledge
that they are not a [1st commercial demining group] accredited demining tool.

•

The clearance conducted by the EOD/Survey team was not in accordance with [1st
commercial demining group] Operations Manager metal free directive dated on the
24.06.02, as metal fragments were located during the BOI investigation.

•

The FP was located in an unsafe area only 73m from the demolition serial. The
correct safety distance for the FP, taking into account the number of mines being
destroyed and the quantity of serviceable explosives used should have been at least
200m away.

•

Both the Team Leader and the Team 2i/c moved forward to check for complete
detonation following the disposal serial. The task is a one man risk and the Team 2i/c
was fortunate not to become a casualty himself, as he was only 15m away from the
accident seat of detonation.

•

There was a single uncontrolled sub-surface detonation of an Israeli No.4 AP mine.
Evidence shows that the crater had blackening to the sides, was of a bulbous shape
with primary metallic and plastic fragmentation lining the bottom and sides.

•

The Israeli No.4 mine detonated whilst the Team Leader inadvertently stood on it
whilst checking the demolition serial. This was however a genuine accident and no
direct blame can be apportioned to the Team Leader.

•

The traumatic amputation of the Team Leader’s foot was due to the positive blast
effects resulting from the disintegration of the Israeli No.4 mine, on the detonation of
the high explosives.

•

The Team Leaders other injuries were sustained from both primary and secondary
fragmentation, resulting from the disintegration of the Israeli No.4 mine, on the
detonation of the high explosives.

•

During the demolition serial there was a partial detonation; a complete detonation of
the donor mine charge actually occurred, but the second Israeli No.4 AP mine failed
to detonate. Following the donor mine charge detonating, the positive blast effects
would have pushed the Israeli No.4 AP mine to the edge of the crater; this would
have been then subsequently covered by the spoil and debris from the donor mine
charge detonating.
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•

The possible reasons for the partial detonation are:
•

Imprecise charge placement of the donor mine charge with the Israeli No.4
AP mine, leading to the detonating wave not being transferred.

•

The firing cable was not pegged out; therefore it may have been inadvertently
moved whilst personnel were retiring to the FP, leading to the movement of
the donor mine charge and no subsequent transferral of the detonating wave.

•

When the first demolition row detonated, the blast wave may have disturbed
the donor mine charge, again leading again to the movement of the donor
mine charge and no subsequent transferral of the detonating wave.

•

The missed Israeli No.4 mine was inside the emergency area cleared by the Team
2i/c. Should someone in the extraction party unintentionally stood on the mine, then
the accident would have been compounded significantly, with the possible loss of life
being the outcome.

•

Local civilian personnel were told to move into a high threat suspect area to assist in
the extraction of the Team Leader.

•

If a detector had been used to check areas of the demolition serial, then the
possibility of the accident occurring would have been minimal.

•

The help and assistance from [Another commercial demining group’s] clearance
assets was invaluable for the BOI investigation.

•

During the initial stages of the investigation, [1st commercial demining group]’s
Investigating Officer was not present. The BOI was only informed on the 22.07.02
that [1st commercial demining group] Investigating Officer would change.

The BOI reservedly accepts [1st commercial demining group] Accident and IMSMA Reports.
The followings points should however be noted:
•

The report was submitted late to the MACC SL.

•

The report is not as detailed as the BOI would expect from an International Clearance
Organisation, following a very serious accident involving a senior employee.

•

The recommendations made however by [1st commercial demining group]’s
Investigating Officer are thorough and comprehensive, all being endorsed and
concurred with, by the MACC SL.

•

The post accident observations made however by the Team Medic are very
comprehensive and fully endorsed and concurred with, by the MACC SL.

•

The passage of information in between the accident site, [1st commercial demining
group] base location and MACC SL was good with all information being passed in a
timely manner.

•

No formal Internal or External QA had been carried out on the EOD/Survey Team
since the start of operations.

•

A reliable HELEVAC capacity, with winching capabilities would have assisted in the
extraction of the Team Leader.

Recommendations
22. The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions:
•

A recommendation is made to the NDO that the [1st commercial demining group]
EOD/Survey and Level 1 Survey licence be withdrawn and [1st commercial demining
group]reassess their Survey requirements and resubmit their plan to the MACC SL
QA Section for accreditation.
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•

A letter of censure is raised by [1st commercial demining group] Project Director on
[1st commercial demining group] Operations Manager identifying the weaknesses in
the task planning and operational management of this task. The letter of censure
should also identify those actions to be taken by [1st commercial demining group]
Operations Manager to ensure similar occurrences do not happen again. A copy of
this letter is to be forwarded to the MACC SL and placed in [1st commercial demining
group]’s accreditation file.

•

All future tasking be co-ordinated through MACC SL Planning Officer. All nonadherences are immediately reported to the MACC SL Programme Manager.

•

All Weekly Summary Reports be verified for accuracy by the MACC SL LAF
Operations Officer, any inaccuracies should be detailed and reported to the MACC
SL Operations Officer.

•

Organisations are to adhere to their accredited SOPs, TSGs and IMAS at all times.
Any major infringements that are reported to the MACC SL QA Officer will be dealt
with by means of the severest penalties available.

•

Minefield numbers M/F 135 and M/F 135A be cleared as soon as practically possible
by [1st commercial demining group] Mine Clearance Team No.1. This is to take place
only after a task plan has been discussed and verified with MACC SL Planning
Officer.

•

MACC SL Operations Department draft for NDO approval, a standard “Demolitions
Notification Request Form”, which all clearance organisations will complete and
forward (hand or fax), to MACC SL prior to any demolitions taking place. Nonconformity to the form requirements will result in no approval being given. On
approval by the NDO, TSGs be amended and the form incorporated as an Annex.

•

Weekly Internal and External QA is to be conducted on every accredited team
operating in Southern Lebanon. All clearance organisations and [another demining
group] are to forward all QA evaluation results of each accredited clearance asset to
the MACC SL QA Officer on a weekly basis, this is also to include details of non
evaluations and the reasons why the evaluation was not conducted.

•

MACC SL Operations Department investigate the possibility of UNIFIL being able to
provide HELEVAC cover (with a winching capability), for clearance operations in
Southern Lebanon.

The recommendations as detailed by [1st commercial demining group]’s Investigating Officer
are to fully implemented by [1st commercial demining group]. For the purpose of this report
they are summarised and reiterated again below:
•

All teams prior to any deployment must be in possession of an operational plan
containing all the relevant information.

•

Closer liaison between organisations and tasking agencies in a must for all future
tasks.

•

SOPs be amended to include the use of a metal detector to check demolition serials.

•

Investigating Officers are to be tasked directly following any accident.

•

SOPs regarding clearance is to be followed fully.

•

The Mine-Lab detector is the only detector that is to be used inside a suspected or
known mined area.

•

A reconnaissance by the Senior Medical Officer (or nominated representative), on
evacuation routes is to be carried out on all tasks.

•

The number of QA staff is to be increased to ensure that QA on all operational teams
is conducted on a regular basis.
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The observations as detailed by [1st commercial demining group]’s EOD/Survey Medic are to
be considered by [1st commercial demining group]. For the purpose of this report they are
summarised and reiterated again below:
•

Mutual support of medical assets is required for remote tasks.

•

An effective handheld VHF system backed by vehicle borne VHF system would have
been useful.

•

“Box splints”, “Body splints”, “Auto-jets” and “Ex-Ox” would be beneficial assets in the
medical packs.

•

All personnel operating in small teams should be trained in the basics of trauma
management; this training should be conducted in similar surroundings and terrain
types that teams are operating in.

•

The counselling of personnel directly involved in accidents to become the norm.

The conclusions and recommendations as detailed in this report be distributed and discussed
among all [1st commercial demining group] Operational Field Staff.

Signed: QA Officer, Mine Action Co-ordination Centre Southern Lebanon

Annexes: [Not made available.]
A. BOI Follow up Target photograph.
B. BOI Post Accident Clearance photograph.

Victim Report
Victim number: 497

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available
(insured HMT)

Time to hospital: 1 hour 50 minutes

Protection issued: None

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Leg
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Below knee
COMMENT: No formal medical report was made available

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy” because
the investigation discovered that the group was acting in breach of agreements and
conducting clearance while pretending to be engaged in Survey. The secondary cause is
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listed as “inadequate equipment” because the group did not have area-markers, had
inadequate detectors, lacked the means to move boulders etc (which they would have had for
a clearance task) and were not equipped to carry out a Medevac without the assistance of
locals who had to enter a high-risk area to do so.
The MACC Board of Inquiry found the list of inadequacies to also include inadequate
handtools. The facts that PPE was not worn, the demolition was poorly laid out and
unsuccessful and the surveyors were in breach of many safety SOPs is taken to imply that
the individuals involved were inadequately trained, despite some of them being field
supervisors.
Inadequate detectors were taken but apparently not used until after the accident, when the
Victim’s second in command waited for the medic to bring a detector before moving in to
rescue the victim.

Related papers
What follows is the original Board of Inquiry report, edited for anonymity and with excess
pictures removed.

REPORT FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD OF INQUIRY – No007/2002
MINE Accident that occurred in OES 1 on 20th July 2002 in which [Demining group] Team
Leader [the Victim] was injured.
Map Reference: UNIFIL Genimap 1:50,000 Sheet A (Tibnin).
References:
A. [Demining group] SOP’s version dated July 2002.
B. Janes Mines Manual.
C. [Demining group] Concept of Operations dated 18.06.02.

Introduction
1. In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), the MACC
SL Programme Manager issued a Convening Order on Saturday 20th July 2002, for an
accident investigation Board of Inquiry. Annex A details the Convening Order.
2. This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry into the Mine Accident that occurred
on the 20th July 2002. Based on the investigation, [Demining group]’s internal report, the
statements from [Demining group] personnel involved in the accident (see Annex B); visits to
the accident site and the photos from the accident site, this accident is considered
preventable.
3. The information provided by [Demining group] to the MACC SL QA Section in the “IMSMA
Accident Report”, attached as Annex C is confirmed. The accident occurred at approximately
1210 hrs on 20th July 2002, in Minefield (M/F) No 135A at Shama, GR 36 706098 670225,
(Seat of Detonation). Annex D details a map of the general area.
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View of the mined area.
Events leading up to the Accident
4. On the 11.07.02 [Demining group] Level 1 Survey Team was tasked by Operations
Manager [name excised] to conduct a survey of minefields in OES-1, in the vicinity of Shama
Village, M/F numbers 135 and 135A. The tasking information was obtained from the
previously issued MACC SL OES areas minefield spread sheets. As there were access
problems in both areas, 2 x Non-Accessible Minefield reports were filed and the information
was passed back to Operations Manager [name excised]; Annex E details the NonAccessible Minefield reports.
5. Based on the non accessible information received from the Level 1 Survey Team, Team
Leader [The victim] then decided to conduct a follow visit of the area on the 17.07.02. During
this visit both M/Fs were located with the help of a local guide and 13 x mines were seen on
or near the surface. Following the visit a “Minefield Appreciation Performa” was completed by
Team Leader [the Victim], Annex F details. {Annex F was not made available.]
6.
On returning from the minefield appreciation visit, a meeting was held between [the
Victim] and Operations Manager [name excised] to decide what the next course of action
would be. It was decided that the best solution would be to destroy the immediate threat
posed by the located mines and following the destruction of the mines, erect a minefield
fence. The task was categorised as a “Demolition/Rapid Response Task” and was planned to
be executed on the 20.07.02.
7. As demolitions would be conducted on the 20.07.02, Operations Manager [name excised]
submitted a verbal “Demolitions Notification Request” to the MACC SL Planning Officer on the
18.07.02. The information that Operation Officer [name excised] states he passed is detailed
at Appendix 6, Annex B to this report. A witness statement by the MACC SL Planning Officer
is detailed at Annex G with the MACC SL Planning Officer’s notes and the “Demolitions
Notification Request” detailed as Appendices to the Annex. [Not made available.]
8. At 0800 hrs on the 20.07.02 [Demining group] EOD/Survey Team deployed on the preplanned “Demolition/Rapid Response Task” to M/F 135 and 135A. The EOD/Survey Team
consisted of the following personnel:
• Team Leader [the Victim]
• Team 2i/c – [name excised].
• Team Medic – [name excised].
• Team Driver – [name excised].
• Observer (Operations Officer) – [name excised].
9. The EOD/Survey Team arrived at the site at 0840hrs, established a Command Post (CP)
and conducted a communications check with [Demining group] Operations. Following a safety
brief by [the Victim], the Team deployed to the vicinity of M/F 135 in order to destroy the
previously located mines. A Firing Point (FP) was located by [the Victim] and Team Medic
[name excised] and Observer [name excised] stayed in that location whilst [the Victim] and
Team 2i/c [name excised] moved to the M/F to destroy 10 x Israeli No4 Anti-Personnel Mines
and 1 x 52mm Mortar Bomb.
10. At 1040 hrs a demolition serial was conducted at M/F 135 and following a period of time
to allow the smoke to dissipate and the debris to stop falling a demolition serial check was
conducted. On the signal “all clear” the team then moved across the Wadi to the vicinity of
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M/F 135A location. A new FP was located and Team Medic [name excised] and Observer
[name excised] were dropped off at the FP. [The Victim] and Team 2i/c [name excised] then
proceeded to M/F 135A to destroy the previously located mines.
11. At M/F 135A a total number of 6 x Israeli No4 AP Mines were prepared for destruction (4
x mines in-situ and 2 x unfuzed mines were to be used as donor charges). The mines were
located in two separate rows with 3 x mines in one row (plus 1 x donor mine) and 1 x mine in
another row (plus 1 x donor mine). Detailed below is a schematic diagram detailing the
approximate position of the mines and the demolition explosive set up, prior to the disposal
serial in M/F 135A.
[The sketch in MS Word did not transfer adequately so is omitted.]
12. At 1155hrs the demolition at M/F 135A was conducted, following a short time period to
allow the smoke to dissipate and the debris to stop falling, [the Victim] and Team 2i/c [name
excised] moved forward to check for complete demolition. Team 2i/c [name excised] started
packing the equipment at the Bench Mark (BM), whilst [the Victim] checked the disposal
serial. He checked the first row of mines and was satisfied that a high order had been
achieved on all four mines. He then moved forward to check the second row when an
uncontrolled detonation occurred. Annex H details the Site Diary for the EOD/Survey Team
(20.07.02).

Events directly following the Accident
13. At approximately 1210 hrs an uncontrolled detonation occurred in M/F 135A, following the
uncontrolled detonation Team Medic [name excised] moved forward from the FP carrying his
trauma pack and a metal detector. On arrival of Team Medic [name excised] at the BM, Team
2i/c [name excised] started to clear a route into and around [the Victim] from the BM, the
emergency marking used was orange spray paint.
14. When an area had been cleared around [the Victim], medical assistance and stabilisation
took place by Team Medic [name excised]. Team 2i/c [name excised] then called Observer
[name excised] and told him to inform [Demining group] Operations and tell Driver [name
excised] to move down from the CP to the accident site with the spine board. Observer [name
excised] was then instructed to move to the main road in Shama village and wait for additional
medical assistance that had been requested.
15. Following the on-site stabilisation, [the Victim] was then moved to the area of M/F 135A
BM. Team 21/c [name excised] then instructed Observer [name excised] to move back to the
accident site with water and to help with the extraction of the casualty. Prior to him moving
back to the accident site, Observer [name excised] instructed a local to wait for the additional
medical assets and when they arrive direct them to the CP. Observer [name excised] then
proceeded to pick up some water from the CP and move back to the accident site.
16. There was then an attempt to move [the Victim] up the hill, but due to the very difficult
terrain, a distance of only approximately 15 metres was achieved. Team 2i/c [name excised]
then tasked Observer [name excised] to go and get some local assistance from Shama
village. As Observer [name excised] was making his way up the hill he saw a local at the top
and told him to bring some more men to assist in the extraction.
17. After a short period of time 4 x local men arrived and the extraction of [the Victim] to the
CP was finally achieved. At the CP the additional [Demining group] personnel then assisted in
transferring [the Victim] into the ambulance. Due to the difficult track conditions, [the Victim]
had to be physically removed from the ambulance in order to get the vehicle over the rough
terrain. On arrival at the main road [the Victim] was then transferred into the Lebanese Red
Cross ambulance for the journey to Jabel Amal Hospital in Tyre.
18. At 1400hrs [the Victim] arrived at Jabel Amal Hospital whereupon he was transferred to
the Emergency Department where additional trauma care was administered; an X-ray was
also performed prior to him being transferred to Hammoud Hospital Sidon by the Lebanese
Red Cross at 1440hrs.
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BOI Accident Investigation Follow Up Actions
19. At 1430 hrs Operation Manager [name excised] arrived at the MACC SL to brief the
MACC SL Planning and QA Officer on the accident. The MACC SL QA Officer was informed
that Operations Manager [name excised] will be heading [Demining group]’s BOI and it was
decided to move to the accident scene in order to make a full appreciation on the situation.
20. On arrival at the accident scene the BOI was met by Team 2i/c [name excised] and a full
and detailed briefing took place, prior to the BOI moving to the CP. On arrival at the CP, it
was decided by the BOI that clearance would have to take place from the CP to the accident
site, before any detailed accident investigation could take place.
21. As [Demining group] MDD assets were not accredited to work in low threat suspect areas
and [Demining group] Manual assets were on their rest day on the 21.07.02, a request was
made through the MACC SL Planning Officer to utilise [another Demining group’s] MDD and
manual assets. On approval from the MACC SL Planning Officer the BOI left the accident
scene.
22. On the 21.07.02, 23.07.02 and 24.07.02 clearance was conducted using both [second
demining group’s] MDD and manual assets and [original Demining group] manual assets to
both M/F 135 and M/F 135A (accident site). Numerous BOI follow up clearance targets were
identified by the BOI and all targets were achieved during the 3 x day’s clearance activities. 1
x Israeli No4 AP mine was also located in M/F135A on the 21.07.02, in a previously cleared
area.
23. All BOI follow up clearance targets as detailed in the following photographs and in the
“Account of Activities” to this report, are shown again pictorially at Annex I, a picture detailing
the BOI post accident clearance is shown at Annex J and a schematic diagram detailing the
accident site is detailed at Annex K.
Note: During the initial stages of the investigation, [the Demining group]’s Investigating Officer
was not present.

[Emergency marking with spray paint. It seems that no marking was used until after the
accident.]

[Demining group emergency marking on the wrong side of the missed mine – beneath the tip
of the prodder.]
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Work History of the Casualty
24. [The Victim] is an extremely experienced EOD Operator having worked with [Demining
group] for nearly 3 years on numerous contracts in various counties worldwide. Prior to his
service with [Demining group] he served in the British Army for 22 years as an EOD
Operator. He is considered by [Demining group] to be a competent and trustworthy employee;
Annex L details [the Victim]’s CV. [Not made available.]

Past History of the Area
25. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) initially, and later, the South Lebanese Army (SLA)
previously occupied temporary positions in and around Shama, with the main position being
located at Al Qusayrat, 1km to the NW of Shama. The mine contaminated areas in and
around Shama consist of the following:
•

2 x route denial minefields that are situated on the SE face of Wadi Jalali ash Sharq
(M/F 135 and M/F 135A).

•

1 x route denial minefield that is situated on the NE face of Wadi Jalali ash Sharq
(M/F 148).

26. IDF Northern Command reported the minefield details on the 12th December 2001, M/F
135A details reported were:
•

Reference Point GR 36 706480 670160.

•

Mine Cluster of mine type 4A.

•

Mines were laid in by the IDF in June 1998.

•

Minefield map is available.

•

“C53” designator number.

Sequence, Documentation and Procedure of Tasking
27. Task Dossier (TD) OES 1 #008 was never issued to [Demining group] and prior to the
BOI investigation, was located in the MACC SL Planning Office. The TD contains full details
of the 3 x minefields in and around Shama, plus details on 2 x booby traps that are also
located in the vicinity of the area.
28. The initial tasking on the 11.07.02 for the Level 1 Survey Team was instigated by
Operation Manager [name excised] the decision to do a follow up visit of the area on the
17.07.02 was made by [the Victim] and the decision to conduct the “Demolition/Rapid
Response Task” was made by both [the Victim] and the Operation Manager [name excised].
29. Other than the demolitions notification for the above “Demolition/Rapid Response Task”
the only information that the MACC SL had on [Demining group] activities in the Shama area
was the information detailed in [Demining group] Weekly Summary Reports for week ending
the 14.07.02 and week ending 21.07.02.
30. For the Weekly Summary Report, week ending 14.07.02, it is detailed that a Level 1
Survey had been conducted on M/F’s 135 and 135A and a “Confirmation visit from Level 1
Survey expat supervisor is required”. For the Weekly Summary Report, week ending
21.07.02, it states that Level 2 Survey on M/F’s 135 and 135A is “Complete”. This report was
handed to MACC SL Operations department at approximately 0915 hrs on the day of the
accident. Annex M details both Weekly Summary Reports. [Not made available.]

Geography and Weather
31. The Shama site is located to the NE of the village of Shama in the Wadi Jalali ash Sharq.
The Wadi runs in a SE to NW direction covering approximately 4 kms in length with a small
river flowing through the Wadi bottom. The land near Shama village is used for both arable
and pastoral farming, the land at the top of the Wadi and throughout the Wadi is intermixed
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with rocky outcrops and moderate scrub and vegetation. At the time of the accident the
weather was fine and sunny with temperatures in the region of 25 – 27 degrees Celsius.

Site Layout and Marking
32. The site layout and minefield marking prior to the accident was not in accordance with
National TSGs and [Demining group] SOPs. The only marking that was present, prior to the
BOI clearance activities were 2 x marked Bench Marks (BMs) at M/Fs 135 and 135A and
spray paint clearance marking from the BMs into the minefields.

Management Supervision and Discipline
33. [Demining group] clearance operation is supervised by an International Operations
Manager and an International EOD/Survey Team Leader was in overall charge of the Shama
site.
34. On the 05.06.02 disciplinary action was taken against [the Victim] following procedural
omissions in M/F 142 and M/F 143. The task site was actually suspended by the MACC SL
Operations and Planning Officers for non-adherence to SOPs, TSGs and IMAS. Following the
task site suspension [the Victim] received a verbal warning and then went on leave.
35. On [the Victim]’s return from leave a Directive was signed by [Demining group]’s
Managing Director and [the Victim] committing [the Victim] to “Conduct any task in
accordance with [Demining group] in-country SOPs (IMAS accredited)”, Annex N details the
signed Directive. [Not made available.]

Quality Assurance and Quality Control
36. [Demining group] Internal Quality Assurance (QA) is achieved through a system of on-site
checks by an International QA Team to ensure adherence to National TSGs and [Demining
group] SOPs; no Internal QA has taken place on the EOD/Survey Team. External QA is
carried out by the MACC SL QA Section [name excised]; no External QA has taken place on
the EOD/Survey team other than the MACC SL Operations department site suspension on
the 05.06.02, as previously detailed.

Communications and Reporting
37. Communications in-between the Shama site and [Demining group] base location is
maintained via the use of the Cell phone system. On site communications in-between team
personnel is maintained via VHF handheld radios. On the day of the accident, the site had
proper and appropriate communications and managed to pass all relevant accident
information back to [Demining group] base location, which in turn passed the information to
the MACC SL in a timely manner. Annex O details the Initial Casualty Report. [Not made
available.]

Medical Details
38. [The Victim] suffered traumatic amputation of his left foot and blast/fragmentation injuries
to his right leg. [Demining group] EOD/Survey Team Medic James administered medical
treatment and stabilisation on-site to [the Victim]. A very difficult extraction of the casualty
then took place to the site CP whereupon the casualty was transferred to the Team
ambulance for the short journey to the main road in Shama; the casualty was then transferred
to a Lebanese Red Cross ambulance for the journey to Jabel Amal Hospital in Tyre.
39. On arrival at Jabel Amal Hospital in Tyre, [the Victim] was transferred to the Emergency
Department where additional trauma care was administered; an X-ray was also performed
prior to him being transferred to Hammoud Hospital Sidon by the Lebanese Red Cross.
Annex P details the medical report from Hammoud Hospital in Sidon.
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Personnel
40. A list of all personnel and their duties is detailed at Annex B. Written statements from
[Demining group] personnel involved in the accident and the [Demining group] internal report
form part of the Appendices to the Annex.

Dress and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
41. At the time of and prior to the accident, no member of the EOD/Survey Team were
wearing any form of PPE, nor was PPE worn during the activities conducted on the 17.07.02

Tools and Equipment
42. At the time of the accident no tools or equipment were being used by [the Victim]. On
inspection however of the EOD/Survey equipment used by the Team it was noted that MD-8
detectors and manual demining probes were present. It is known by the Investigating Officer
that a decision had been previously made by the Operations Manager not to deploy the MD-8
detector in known mined areas, due to the problems associated with ground contamination
and the detector compensator.
43. Likewise it is known that manual demining probes had all been withdrawn from clearance
teams in favour of using an excavation trowel only. [Demining group] have a policy of not
using demining probes, therefore probes are not part of the accredited clearance equipment.
Reference A also refers.

Details of Mine Involved
44. The Israeli No4 AP blast mine consists of a plastic box with a hinged lid that overlaps the
sides. The main charge is 188g of cast TNT, housed in an internal plastic compartment, which
occupies just over half of the volume of the box at the hinged end. The wall of this
compartment is threaded to accept the fuze assembly; the remainder of the box is empty.
45. The metal fuze assembly, which incorporates a lead-shear arming delay, is fitted through
a hole in the end of the mine and screwed into the wall of the charge compartment and sealed
with a rubber O-ring. The arming pin protrudes through the end of the mine opposite the
hinge. The arming pin is attached to a pull ring, which is looped over the fuze body and
retained by a plastic cap during transit for additional safety. The striker is retained and
secured by a square shaped slotted plate on which the open end of the box rests.
46. The mine is designed purely for direct pressure operation. To arm the mine, the plastic
cap on the end of the fuze is removed to release the pull ring; the arming pin is then removed.
The spring-loaded striker is retained until it has sheared through a lead wire, which runs
through holes in the end of the fuze. The arming process normally takes several hours. Once
armed, the striker is retained only by the slotted plate; pressure on the lid (in excess of 8kgs),
simply pushes the slotted plate out which in turn releases the spring loaded central striker.
The striker then impacts with the integral fuze detonator, which then passes the detonating
wave to the main TNT charge causing the mine to disintegrate. (Paragraphs 44 – 46 inclusive
extracted from Reference B)
47. There have been instances reported where foreign bodies have embedded themselves in
between the recess in the striker mechanism and the slotted striker retaining plate, therefore
allowing the partial downward release of the plate. The spring-loaded striker is now therefore
only being held by the foreign body. Accumulated pressure over a period of time (especially in
heavy soil conditions), can also slowly release the slotted striker retaining plate. This will
therefore reduce the direct pressure required to activate the mine.

Account of Activities
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48. The following is a description of the events before and after the accident. The information
from the investigation forms the basis of the description of events:

20/07/02
• 1210hrs – Uncontrolled detonation at M/F 135A.
• 1223hrs – MACC SL Planning Officer informed of accident.
• 1225hrs – MACC SL QA Officer informed of accident.
• 1230hrs – BOI Convened by MACC SL Programme Manager.
• 1305hrs – Casualty extracted to CP.
• 1323hrs – Red Cross Ambulance arrives at Shama village.
• 1331hrs – Casualty transferred to Red Cross vehicle at Shama village.
• 1347hrs – Team 2i/c secures the accident site.
• 1400hrs – Casualty arrives at Jabel Amal Hospital Tyre.
• 1430hrs – [Demining group] Operations Manager arrives at MACC SL and briefs
Planning and QA Officers. MACC SL QA Officer is informed that the Operations
Manager will be heading [Demining group]’s BOI.
• 1440 hrs - Casualty leaves Jabel Amal Hospital Tyre and moves to Hammoud
Hospital Sidon.
• 1445 hrs – BOI and [Demining group] Operations Manager leaves MACC SL on route
to Shama.
• 1515hrs – BOI and [Demining group] Operations Manager arrives at Shama and is
briefed by the Team 2i/c.
• 1520hrs - Casualty arrives at Hammoud Hospital Sidon.
• 1520hrs – [Demining group] Medical support arrives at Shama.
• 1525hrs – BOI, [Demining group] Operations Manager and Team 2i/c move to area of
accident.
• 1535hrs - BOI, [Demining group] Operations Manager and Team 2i/c arrive to area of
accident.
• Accident site is viewed from a known safe area (agricultural land).
• Group discussion held regarding gaining access to the accident site on the
21.07.02:
• [Demining group] MDD assets are not accredited for low
threat/suspect area work.
• [Demining group] Manual assets are on their rest day on the
21.07.02.
• MACC SL QA Officer requests [Second demining group’s] MDD and
Manual assets through MACC SL Planning Officer.
•
1600hrs – Approval for the use of [Second demining
group’s] assets given by MACC SL Planning Officer.
• 1605hrs – BOI, [Demining group] Operations Manager and Team 2i/c leave the area
of accident.
• 1625hrs - BOI, [Demining group] Operations Manager and Team 2i/c leave Shama.
• 1700hrs – BOI arrives at MACC SL and briefs Programme Manager and Planning
Officer.
• 1800hrs – Planning telephone conversation between MACC SL QA Officer and
[Second demining group’s] Programme Manager, regarding the use of [Second
demining group’s] clearance assets on the 21.07.02.
21/07/02
• 0345hrs – [Second demining group’s] MDD assets leave Ett Taibe on route to MACC
SL.
• 0400hrs – [Second demining group’s] Manual assets leave Bayt Yahun on route to
MACC SL.
• 0500hrs – BOI and [Second demining group’s] assets RV at MACC SL.
• 0510hrs – BOI and [Second demining group’s] assets leave MACC SL on route to
accident site.
• 0545hrs – BOI and [Second demining group’s] assets arrive at Shama.
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0550hrs - Track clearance (rocks and trees), from Shama village main road to the site
Administrative Area (AA).
0605hrs – 0630 hrs - Site briefing, target reconnaissance and site set up.
0630hrs – MDD assets deploy to target No1 and 2 (LAF Mine Sign and M/F 135A
BM).
0730hrs – [Demining group] personnel (names excised), arrive at site.
0850hrs – MDD verification and follow up marking completed to targets No1 and 2.
0900hrs – Close reconnaissance conducted by [names excised] to target No3 (M/F
135A first demolition row).
0905hrs – [Second demining group’s] MDD assets leave site.
0910hrs – Manual assets deployed to target No3.
1030hrs – Manual assets clear up to target No3.
1035hrs - Close reconnaissance conducted by [names excised] to target No4
(Accident seat of detonation).
1045hrs – Manual assets deployed to target No4.
1135hrs – Mine located in a previously cleared area on route to target No4.
1140hrs – Demolition request to MACC SL Planning Officer, request authorised.
1210hrs – Demolition of mine.
1220hrs - Manual assets deployed to target No4.
1230hrs – Manual assets clear up to target No4.
1235hrs - Close reconnaissance conducted by [names excised] to target No5 (“Key
hole clearance of the emergency marked area).
1240hrs - Manual assets deployed to target No5.
1335hrs – Manual assets clear target No5.
1340hrs - Close reconnaissance conducted by [names excised] to target No6 (M/F
135A firing point).
1345hrs - Manual assets deployed to target No6.
1505hrs - Manual assets clear target No6.
1510hrs – 1600hrs – BOI complete the day’s investigation.
1605hrs – BOI leave accident site on route to MACC SL.
1700hrs – BOI arrives at MACC SL and briefs Programme Manager and Planning
Officer.

22/07/02
• 0945hrs – BOI leaves MACC SL on route to [Demining group] Base Location to
conduct witness interviews.
• 1000hrs – BOI arrives at [Demining group] Base Location to conduct witness
interviews.
• 1250 hrs – BOI leaves [Demining group] Base Location on route to MACC SL.
• 1220 hrs – BOI arrives at MACC SL and briefs Programme Manager and Planning
Officer.

23/07/02
• 0345hrs – [Second demining group’s] MDD assets leave Ett Taibe on route to
Shama.
• 0415hrs –[Demining group] Manual assets leave Bayt Yahun on route to Shama.
• 0430hrs – BOI RV at MACC SL.
• 0435hrs – BOI leaves MACC SL on route to accident site.
• 0500hrs – BOI arrive at Shama.
• 0515 hrs - Site briefing, target reconnaissance and site set up.
• 0610hrs – MDD assets deploy to target No7 (LAF Mine Sign).
• 0810hrs – MDD verification and follow up marking completed to target No7.
• 0820hrs – Close reconnaissance conducted by [names excised] to target No8 (M/F
135 BM).
• 0830hrs – [Second demining group’s] MDD assets leave site.
• 0845hrs – Manual assets deployed to target No8.
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1330hrs – Manual assets clear up to target No8.
1335hrs - Close reconnaissance conducted by [names excised] to target No9 (M/F
135).
1355hrs – BOI leave accident site on route to MACC SL.
1445hrs – BOI arrives at MACC SL and briefs Programme Manager.
1515hrs – Request to, and approval from [Second demining group’s] for the use of
MDD assets for the 24.07.02.
1600hrs – BOI briefs MACC SL Planning Officer.

24/07/02
• 0345hrs – [Second demining group’s] MDD assets leave Ett Taibe on route to
Shama.
• 0415hrs –[Demining group] Manual assets leave Bayt Yahun on route to Shama.
• 0430hrs – BOI RV at MACC SL.
• 0435hrs – BOI leaves MACC SL on route to accident site.
• 0500hrs – BOI arrive at Shama.
• 0515 hrs - Site briefing, target reconnaissance and site set up.
• 0605hrs – MDD assets deploy to target No9 (M/F 135).
• 0750hrs – MDD verification and follow up marking completed to target No9.
• 0805hrs – Close reconnaissance conducted by [names excised] to target No10 (Key
hole clearance of the worked area).
• 0835hrs – [Second demining group’s] MDD assets leave site.
• 0835hrs – Manual assets deployed to target No10.
• 1005hrs – Mine located in a previously uncleared area.
• 1010hrs – Demolition request to MACC SL Planning Officer, request authorised.
• 1040hrs – Demolition of mine.
• 1100hrs - Manual assets deployed to target No10.
• 1235hrs – BOI stops clearance at target No10.
• 1300hrs – BOI leaves accident site on route to Majda Zun in order to take a picture
from the other side of the Wadi.
• 1400hrs – BOI leaves Majda Zun on route to MACC SL.
• 1440hrs – BOI arrive at MACC SL and briefs Programme Manager and Planning
Officer.

25.07.02
• 0900hrs - BOI leaves MACC SL on route to Hammoud Hospital Sidon.
• 0955 hrs - BOI arrives at Hammoud Hospital to conduct a witness interview with [the
Victim].
• 1105hrs – BOI leaves Hammoud Hospital on route to MACC SL.
• 1210hrs - BOI arrives at MACC SL.
• 1500hrs – BOI briefs MACC SL programme Manager and Planning Officer.

Insurance Details
49. [The Victim] is covered by the standard [Demining group] insurance for all International
personnel in mine/UXO clearance activities in Lebanon. All insurance policies for [Demining
group] are through HMT Insurers of London. A copy of the scale of entitlements is held at the
MACC SL QA Section.

Conclusions
50. Based on the investigation, the statements and visits to the site, the BOI concludes the
following:
• TD OES 1 # 008 was never issued to [Demining group] for clearance operations and
therefore the EOD/Survey Team was tasked with the minimum of information on both
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the minefields and booby traps in the area, a fact that [Demining group] Operations
Manager was fully aware of.
No details of the relevant M/F or BT records were obtained from the MACC SL prior
to the activities taking place on the 17.07.02.
No Booby Trap (BT) information was detailed in the Minefield Appreciation Performa
completed by [the Victim] on the 17.07.02, as the information was contained in the
Task Dossier which was located at the MACC SL.
There are discrepancies in what was stated and what was actually recorded and
detailed in the “Demolitions Notification Request”.
The MACC SL Planning Officer was left without any reservation, that the “Demolitions
Notification Request” was for a standard EOD task where UXO were being destroyed
and not for mines being destroyed in a minefield.
The whole task was seen by [Demining group] as a “Target Reduction” opportunity,
where 2 x mined areas could be speedily cleared without any knowledge of or input
from the MACC SL Planning Officer, this was an attempt to conduct the task under
the masquerade of a “Demolition/Rapid Response Task”.
[Demining group]’s EOD/Survey Teams “Demolition/Rapid Response Task” was
conducted 3 x days after the initial appreciation visit.
[Demining group] Operations Manager displayed a lack of operational command and
control of the EOD/Survey Team. There was minimal task planning and no
consultation with MACC SL Planning Officer regarding a clearance operation in a
known mined area. This was in total disregard to Reference C.
The information contained in the Weekly Summary Reports submitted by [Demining
group] to the MACC SL was inaccurate.
[The Victim] contravened the Directive signed on the 21.06.02 regarding his
commitment to conduct any task in accordance with [Demining group] in-country
SOPs (IMAS accredited).
The on-site marking in both M/F 135 and M/F 135A conducted on the 17.07.02 was
not in accordance with [Demining group] SOPs, National TSGs or IMAS.
No permanent marking stores were seen by the BOI at Shama site on the 20.07.02, it
is difficult to therefore understand how a permanent fence was going to be erected
following the demolition serial.
No route clearance to remove the large rocks and boulders was conducted by the
EOD/Survey Team. Should this have happened then the CASEVAC of [the Victim]
would have been much smoother.
No [Demining group] clearance was conducted through the low threat suspect area
(from the CP to the LAF mine signs). Nor was any clearance conducted through the
high threat suspect area (from the LAF mine sign to [Demining group]’s BMs).
No PPE was worn by any member of the EOD/Survey Team during the activities
conducted in M/F 135 and M/F 135A on the 17.07.02 and 20.07.02.
MD-8 detectors were deployed in a known mined area with the full knowledge of the
problems associated with ground contamination and the detector compensator.
Manual demining probes were used in a known mined area with the full knowledge
that they are not a [Demining group] accredited demining tool.
The clearance conducted by the EOD/Survey team was not in accordance with
[Demining group] Operations Manager metal free directive dated on the 24.06.02, as
metal fragments were located during the BOI investigation.
The FP was located in an unsafe area only 73m from the demolition serial. The
correct safety distance for the FP, taking into account the number of mines being
destroyed and the quantity of serviceable explosives used should have been at least
200m away.
Both [the Victim] and Team 2i/c [name excised] moved forward to check for complete
detonation following the disposal serial. The task is a one man risk and Team 2i/c
[name excised] was fortunate not to become a casualty himself, as he was only 15m
away from the accident seat of detonation.
There was a single uncontrolled sub-surface detonation of an Israeli No4 AP mine.
Evidence shows that the crater had blackening to the sides, was of a bulbous shape
with primary metallic and plastic fragmentation lining the bottom and sides.
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The Israeli No4 mine detonated whilst [the Victim] inadvertently stood on it whilst
checking the demolition serial. This was however a genuine accident and no direct
blame can be apportioned to [the Victim].
The traumatic amputation of [the Victim]’s foot was due to the positive blast effects
resulting from the disintegration of the Israeli No4 mine, on the detonation of the high
explosives.
[The Victim]’s other injuries were sustained from both primary and secondary
fragmentation, resulting from the disintegration of the Israeli No4 mine, on the
detonation of the high explosives.
During the demolition serial there was a partial detonation; a complete detonation of
the donor mine charge actually occurred, but the second Israeli No4 AP mine failed to
detonate. Following the donor mine charge detonating, the positive blast effects
would have pushed the Israeli No4 AP mine to the edge of the crater; this would have
been then subsequently covered by the spoil and debris from the donor mine charge
detonating.
The possible reasons for the partial detonation are:
• Imprecise charge placement of the donor mine charge with the Israeli No4
AP mine, leading to the detonating wave not being transferred.
• The firing cable was not pegged out; therefore it may have been inadvertently
moved whilst personnel were retiring to the FP, leading to the movement of
the donor mine charge and no subsequent transferral of the detonating wave.
• When the first demolition row detonated, the blast wave may have disturbed
the donor mine charge, again leading again to the movement of the donor
mine charge and no subsequent transferral of the detonating wave.
The missed Israeli No4 mine was inside the emergency area cleared by Team 2i/c
[name excised]. Should someone in the extraction party unintentionally stood on the
mine, then the accident would have been compounded significantly, with the possible
loss of life being the outcome.
Local civilian personnel were told to move into a high threat suspect area to assist in
the extraction of [the Victim].
If a detector had been used to check areas of the demolition serial, then the
possibility of the accident occurring would have been minimal.
The help and assistance from [Second demining group’s] clearance assets was
invaluable for the BOI investigation.
During the initial stages of the investigation, [Demining group]’s Investigating Officer
was not present. The BOI was only informed on the 22.07.02 that [Demining group]
Investigating Officer would change.
The BOI reservedly accepts [Demining group] Accident and IMSMA Reports. The
followings points should however be noted:
• The report was submitted late to the MACC SL.
• The report is not as detailed as the BOI would expect from an International
Clearance Organisation, following a very serious accident involving a senior
employee.
• The recommendations made however by [Demining group]’s Investigating
Officer are thorough and comprehensive, all being endorsed and concurred
with, by the MACC SL.
• The post accident observations made however by Medic [name excised] are
very comprehensive and fully endorsed and concurred with, by the MACC
SL.
The passage of information in between the accident site, [Demining group] base
location and MACC SL was good with all information being passed in a timely
manner.
No formal Internal or External QA had been carried out on the EOD/Survey Team
since the start of operations.
A reliable HELEVAC capacity, with winching capabilities would have assisted in the
extraction of [the Victim].
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Recommendations
51. The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions:
• A recommendation is made to the NDO that the [Demining group] EOD/Survey and
Level 1 Survey licence be withdrawn and [Demining group] reassess their Survey
requirements and resubmit their plan to the MACC SL QA Section for accreditation.
• A letter of censure is raised by [Demining group] Project Director on [Demining group]
Operations Manager identifying the weaknesses in the task planning and operational
management of this task. The letter of censure should also identify those actions to
be taken by [Demining group] Operations Manager to ensure similar occurrences do
not happen again. A copy of this letter is to be forwarded to the MACC SL and placed
in [Demining group]’s accreditation file.
• All future tasking be co-ordinated through MACC SL Planning Officer. All nonadherences are immediately reported to the MACC SL Programme Manager.
• All Weekly Summary Reports be verified for accuracy by the MACC SL LAF
Operations Officer, any inaccuracies should be detailed and reported to the MACC
SL Operations Officer.
• Organisations are to adhere to their accredited SOPs, TSGs and IMAS at all times.
Any major infringements that are reported to the MACC SL QA Officer will be dealt
with by means of the severest penalties available.
• Minefield numbers M/F 135 and M/F 135A be cleared as soon as practically possible
by [Demining group] Mine Clearance Team No1. This is to take place only after a task
plan has been discussed and verified with MACC SL Planning Officer.
• MACC SL Operations Department draft for NDO approval, a standard “Demolitions
Notification Request Form”, which all clearance organisations will complete and
forward (hand or fax), to MACC SL prior to any demolitions taking place. Nonconformity to the form requirements will result in no approval being given. On
approval by the NDO, TSGs be amended and the form incorporated as an Annex.
• Weekly Internal and External QA is to be conducted on every accredited team
operating in Southern Lebanon. All clearance organisations and [the commercial QA
group] are to forward all QA evaluation results of each accredited clearance asset to
the MACC SL QA Officer on a weekly basis, this is also to include details of non
evaluations and the reasons why the evaluation was not conducted.
• MACC SL Operations Department investigate the possibility of UNIFIL being able to
provide HELEVAC cover (with a winching capability), for clearance operations in
Southern Lebanon.
• The recommendations as detailed by [Demining group]’s Investigating Officer are to
fully implemented by [Demining group]. For the purpose of this report they are
summarised and reiterated again below:
• All teams prior to any deployment must be in possession of an operational
plan containing all the relevant information.
• Closer liaison between organisations and tasking agencies in a must for all
future tasks.
• SOPs be amended to include the use of a metal detector to check demolition
serials.
• Investigating Officers are to be tasked directly following any accident.
• SOPs regarding clearance is to be followed fully.
• The Mine-Lab detector is the only detector that is to be used inside a
suspected or known mined area.
• A reconnaissance by the Senior Medical Officer (or nominated
representative), on evacuation routes is to be carried out on all tasks.
• The number of QA staff is to be increased to ensure that QA on all
operational teams is conducted on a regular basis.
• The observations as detailed by [Demining group]’s EOD/Survey Medic [name
excised] are to be considered by [Demining group]. For the purpose of this report they
are summarised and reiterated again below:
• Mutual support of medical assets is required for remote tasks.
• An effective handheld VHF system backed by vehicle borne VHF system
would have been useful.
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•
•
•
•

“Box splints”, “Body splints”, “Auto-jets” and “Ex-Ox” would be beneficial
assets in the medical packs.
All personnel operating in small teams should be trained in the basics of
trauma management; this training should be conducted in similar
surroundings and terrain types that teams are operating in.
The counselling of personnel directly involved in accidents to become the
norm.

The conclusions and recommendations as detailed in this report be distributed and
discussed among all [Demining group] Operational Field Staff.

Signed: QA Officer, Mine Action Co-ordination Centre Southern Lebanon

Annexes: [Most not made available.]
A. MACC SL convening order for accident investigation Board of Inquiry.
B.
List of personnel involved with attached statements as Appendices.
C.
IMSMA Mine/UXO accident report.
D. Map of the general area.
E
. [Demining group] Level 1 survey non-accessible report.
F. [Demining group] Minefield appreciation performa.
G. MACC SL Planning Officer witness statement.
H. [Demining group] Site Diary.
I. BOI Follow up Target photograph.
J. BOI Post accident clearance photograph.
K. Schematic diagram of the accident area/scene.
L. [the Victim]’s CV.
M. [Demining group] Weekly Summary reports – we 14.07.02 and 21.07.02.
N. [the Victim] signed [Demining group] directive.
O. Initial casualty report.
P. Medical report from Hammoud Hospital.
Comments by the MACC SL Planning Officer
The Conclusions and Recommendations made by the MACC SL Quality Assurance Officer in
The Report for Accident Investigation Board of Inquiry – No 007 / 2002 are fully concurred
with. Notwithstanding the very serious breaches of [Demining group] SOPs, National TSGs
and IMAS at the two minefield sites on the ground, what is of even graver concern is the
blatant refusal by the [Demining group] Operations Manager to follow agreed tasking
procedures.
The guise given for this refusal to follow agreed tasking procedures was explained as a
“Demolition Rapid Response Task”, where because of the immediate threat to the local
population it was deemed appropriate to wait three days to instigate this action. It was also
stated in the [Demining group] Operations Managers statement that the site was then to be
fenced using proper minefield marking. No minefield fencing was on the site on the day the
accident occurred; one must then assume that the site was to be fenced at a later date. No
community liaison was involved in the planning process, so one must again assume that the
local community after hearing the demolitions that were conducted would have to make their
own conclusions as to the final outcome of the mined Wadi in question.
To summarise, no tasking authority, no task dossier and no task co-ordination led to the
deployment of a poorly informed, poorly equipped team of men on a “Demolition Rapid
Response Task”, which even if successful in the destruction of the mines located would have
left the site in an even more dangerous state than it was first encountered.
The accident that resulted in Mr [the Victim]’s injuries are tragic, however the missed mine
located 10cm from the marked route into his accident location are a reminder that this tragic
accident could have been far worse. It took 6 men (4 local personnel not involved in the
“Demolition Rapid Response Task” ), 55 minutes to move 1 casualty 109 metres and this
was achieved with great difficulty, a second accident caused by the narrowly missed mine
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would very likely have turned evacuation of both personnel into a highly probable fatality
scenario.

Signed; Planning Officer, Mine Action Co-ordination Centre Southern Lebanon.

Comments by the MACC SL Programme Managers
I have read the BOI report and I concur with the conclusions and recommendations of the
Board.
I note that there have been a number of procedural errors in relation to the tasking of the EOD
Survey Team which I consider to have been a contributing factor to placing the team
unnecessarily at risk. Clearly this was a mined area clearance task and not an EOD task. This
should have been recognized at the early stages and the EOD Team should not have been
deployed without the appropriate assets and they should have had all of the available
information. I find it troubling that the minefield records for these particular minefields were
still sitting in the task dossier held at the MACC. The information would have been released
had it been requested. This point had been made clear only the week before.
The actions of the EOD Team on site clearly indicate that the Team was not working in
compliance with accepted international standards, nor with the national technical and safety
guidelines, or their own company SOPs. It can be concluded from the evidence that there
appeared to be some haste to complete this task, however, I do not concur entirely with the
justification given that this task was undertaken to prevent injury to local children. This is
supported by the lack of fencing materials on site with the EOD Survey Team with which to
fence off the area to prevent entry into the area after they had completed their day’s work. In
summary, I conclude that the task was planned and executed hastily and this fact contributed
to the accident. In this regard, I will be recommending to the National Demining Office that the
licences for the Company Level One and EOD Survey Teams be withdrawn, and that the
Company be required to resubmit their survey plan with reconfigured assets and clear tasking
procedures. The Company should submit a new plan for survey operations for accreditation
and licensing as appropriate.
Given the poor procedural tasking, planning, coordination, and post accident administration of
this particular task, I conclude that a degree of responsibility must rest with the Company
Operations Manager. Accordingly, I support the recommendation in relation to a letter of
censure in this case.
On the accident itself, and based on the evidence gathered at the site and from the witness
statements, I concur with the conclusions of the Board into what has caused the mine to
function causing injury. Given the circumstances at the time of the detonation, and given the
nature of the ground, the environment in which the minefield had been laid, and the sensitive
nature of this particular mine, I do not believe that there was at that time an error in drill on the
part of the EOD operator, [the Victim]. It is unfortunate that he has suffered a traumatic injury
and I do not consider his actions at that time to have been at fault.
While there were many procedural errors in the drills during the early stages of the task, it
should be noted that the actions of [the Victim]’s team-mates on the occurrence of the
explosion showed a high degree of cool-headedness and courage. It is not easy to witness a
team-mate, especially one of [the Victim]’s calibre, fall victim to a mine. The actions taken by
[names excised] were quick, effective, and in all probability life-saving. They are to be
commended for maintaining their professionalism and displaying the fortitude to get [the
Victim] to proper medical care as quickly as possible in difficult circumstances.

Signed: both the UN Programme Manager & NDO Representative, MACC Southern Lebanon
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Statements
The following witness statement from Team Leader [the Victim] was conducted at 1000 hrs on
the 25.07.02 at Hammoud Hospital, Sidon. The statement was taken verbally by the BOI
Investigating Officer.

Q1.

Explain what you remember happened before the accident occurred?

A1.
I went back to check the serial, stood on the edge of the crater and the detonation
occurred, I did not stand inside the crater. The next thing I know was that I was lying face
down and I managed to push myself up on my elbows.

Q2.

Whose decision was it to go back to the area on the 20.07.02?

A2.
I had a discussion with Operations Manager [name excised] and it was decided to go
back and destroy the mines previously located as children had been in the area.
Q3.

What were the parameters you were given for the task on the 20.07.02?

A3.

To destroy the previously located mines.

Q4.

Whose decision was it to conduct the activities on the 17.07.02.

A4.

Operations Manager [name excised]’s decision.

Q5.

What were the parameters you were given for the task on the 17.07.02?

A5.

To get as much information on the minefields.

Q6.

Where did you get the information on the area from?

A6.

From the OES spreadsheet information.

Q7.

How did you set up the demolition serial?

A7.

[The Victim] detailed the set up as shown at Page 3 to the accident report.

Q8.

What do you know about the Demolition Notification Request?

A8.
I detailed the 2 x grid references and Operations Manager [name excised] then put it
through MACC SL Operations. I do not know what the specific details were.

Q9.

Why were you using the MD-8 detector?

A9.
There were no spare Mine-Lab detectors, the EOD/Survey Team has always used
the MD-8, and I have not been trained on Mine-Lab’s.

Signed: QA Officer, MACC Southern Lebanon.
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